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REVIVING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS? RECENT AND UPCOMING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 2010 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS SECTION ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW
Professor Scott A. Moss*: Today's topic is "Reviving Employee
Rights? Recent and Upcoming Employment Discrimination Legislation."
At any given year, you could do an update on the status of legislation. PJ
O'Rourke once asked when our government would decide that we have
enough law - when could we say "Stick a fork in it, it's done?"' I think
we've seen enough of the political system to know that the answer is,
"Never". The Congress is never done legislating. There always is more to
do, or at least a perception of more to do. But while major employment and
civil rights legislation is a constant over time, it's not consistent over time,
and we are entering an interesting period, which is why we are here.
In the past half century or thereabouts, there have been a few periods
during which we have seen a real flurry of important employment or civil
rights legislation. We all know, of course, the 1964 to 1968 period when
we had the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 itself really several pieces of
important legislation; the Voting Rights Act of 1965;3 and the Fair Housing
Act of 1968.4 I Will skip over the 1970s in the interest of time. In 1990 to
1994, there was another little flurry of legislation, from the Americans with
Disabilities Act5 to the Civil Rights Act of 19916 and the Family Medical
Leave Act.7 And we are here today because we may be at the beginning of
another such period. We have the ADA Amendments Act in 2008,8 the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. P.J. O'ROuRKE, PARLIAMENT OF WHORES: A LONE HUMORIST ATTEMPTS TO EXPLAIN THE
ENTIRE U.S. GOVERNMENT 14 (2003).
2. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 28 and 42
U.S.C. (2006)).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-11-, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-74 (2006)).
4. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2006)).
5. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 USC §§ 12101-213 (2000)).
6. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat., 1071 (codified at scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
7. Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (1993) (codified as amended at 29 USC §§ 2611-19 (2006) and
in scattered sections of 2, 5, and 29 U.S.C.).
8. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213).
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Ledbetter Act in 20099 and, as we will hear today, this just may be the tip
of the iceberg of what is below the surface and coming to the surface. We
overstate the point if we say that we are entering a period on par with the
mid-60s era, but I think it does not exaggerate to say that, depending on
how things shake out in the coming years, this period could be up there
with the early 90s in terms of remaking the landscape of our field, at least
to some degree, and that of course depends on what passes and what
doesn't.
There are many reasons why these historical moments happen. We are
at a point, after eight years of a president, and to a lesser extent of
Congress, that was reluctant to undertake major expansions of employee
rights. So there is a bit of a bottleneck and a backlog in the legislative
works.
Another reason these events come in waves is that we passed the
major laws in the early 90s and it takes a decade or so for the courts to sift
through how they will interpret these laws. We now have the benefit of
time to reflect on what worked, what didn't, and what is enough. The ADA
was passed in 1990. We had Supreme Court decisions from 1998 to 2002
or so, and then we reflected upon the impact of those decisions.10 So we
may be at the right historical point because we are both removed in time
from the last such flurry of legislation and also have had a bottleneck of
pending proposals.
We all know that there is a wave of possible legislation. We have
heard about a lot of it, and we know the general contours of what is being
proposed, but we don't necessarily know the exact details of some of these
laws. We also don't know how far along they are, and we don't know where
certain bills are in the pipeline ahead of others. We hope that today's panel
will be an informational panel, rather giving you our views on the merits of
the law - a we-report-you-decide panel, like Fox News.
With that background, let me introduce our panelists. The first two
panelists came from a call for presentations we put out for junior faculty to
9. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (to be codified at scattered sections of 29 and 42
U.S.C.).
10. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (limiting the definition of
"major-life activity" to those activities that an individual is required to perform on a day-to-day basis,
and not including the category of "working"); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999)
(establishing that to properly determine whether an individual is disabled under the ADA, the individual
must be considered in his or her mitigated state). The goal of the ADAAA was to overturn the Supreme
Court decisions in Sutton and Toyota, and to reiterate the Congressional intent to keep the scope of the
ADA broad and inclusive. Therefore, an individual must be considered in his unmitigated state to
determine whether he has a disability under the ADA. Further, the category of working is considered to
be a "major life activity" under the ADA. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a), 122 Stat. 3553.
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really get their hands dirty and eat their vegetables and mix the metaphors
and come up with these great handouts that show pending legislation and
its status." So, if grading didn't ruin their December vacations, certainly
producing these charts did, and we can all appreciate their sacrifice for our
edification.
Our first panelist is Sandra Sperino, who is in her second year at
Temple University, Beasley School of Law. She is no stranger to
employment discrimination academia having published, by my count, ten
articles in the last five years while holding various faculty positions.12
Before entering academia Sandra spent many years as an employment
litigator where her work litigating appeals included writing the briefs in a
case that went to the U.S. Supreme Court,13 so she is well suited for the
task at hand here.
Our next panelist, who is splitting up the legislative update with
Sandra, is Robin Runge, a new Assistant Professor at the University of
North Dakota School of Law. But she is not new to our field and is a
veteran of legislative reform efforts in particular. Robin is a former D.C.
and San Francisco based employment litigator and policy advocate who
worked with the late Senator Ted Kennedy's staff on legislation to amend
the FMLA, apropos of what she will be discussing today, and also
participated in other efforts to expand various federal employment and
other discrimination laws. At the University of North Dakota, she teaches
in the employment and housing law clinic, where she litigates employment
discrimination claims.
Our third panelist is Charles Sullivan, who has been teaching and
publishing on employment discrimination for a couple more years than
Robin and Sandra have. We have fewer than two hours so I can't do a
dramatic recitation of Charlie's publications. Suffice it to say that they
include numerous bright red casebooks that we all know and love1 4 and
read to our children at night, and he is also, most importantly perhaps, the
11. These handouts are available at <http://www.1aw.temple.edu/Pages/Faculty/NFaculty
SperinoMain.aspx>.
12. See, e.g., Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell-Douglas Is Not Justified by Any
Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUSTON L. REV. 743 (2006); A Modern Theory of Direct
Corporate Liability for Title VII, 61 ALA. L. REV. 773 (2010); Judicial Preemption of Punitive
Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REv. 227 (2009); Recreating Diversity in Employment Law by Debunking the
Myth of the McDonnell-Douglas Monolith, 44 HOUSTON L. REV. 349 (2007).
13. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003).
14. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW & PRACTICE (4th ed. 2009) (with Lauren Walter);
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (6th ed. 2003) (with Michael J. Zimmer
and Rebecca Hanner White); CASES AND MATERIAL ON EMPLOYMENT LAW (1993) (with Rachel
Arnow-Richman and Timothy P. Glynn).
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author of my favorite academic paper ever, a 2005 paper entitled, "The
Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote,"5 which I highly recommend to you.
It is an empirical study of the puffery we academics engage in through the
asterisk footnote after our names. He has been teaching at the Seton Hall
University School of Law for just over thirty years having previously
taught at the University of South Carolina and University of Arkansas Law
Schools. Charlie will take a shot at answering the question proposed by our
title, "Reviving Employee Rights?" The reason for the question mark is that
the big question posed by all this legislation is whether it all matters, and
whether it will make a difference. So Charlie will give some mix, whatever
he chooses, of historical perspective on other legislative reform efforts and
their impact or lack of impact, and on what the possible outcomes and
impact might be of these legislative reform efforts. He will be discussing
essentially the forest after Sandra and Robin detail the trees.
Professor Sandra Sperino*: Good afternoon and thank you everyone
for coming. I want to start by thanking Scott for inviting me to be on this
panel. When I got the invitation this summer, I was really excited about the
topic - who wouldn't be - reviving employee rights, or are we in this time
of revival? Then I did all the work that Scott asked me to do, and I was not
so excited about he topic anymore. It had nothing to do with the work; it
had to do with what I anticipated this panel was going to discuss. As we
started preparing for the panel, we thought the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act (ENDA)1 6 was going to be passed and we thought the
Arbitration Fairness Act" was going to be enacted. We thought the
Paycheck Fairness Act18 had a good chance of becoming law. Instead what
we have to talk about are some older pieces of legislation that have had
some updates recently. Over the last year, we have significant
developments in the ADA Amendments,19 and I will refer to them that way
rather than the ADAAA, and we have the Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act (GINA), 2 0 both of which were passed by the Bush
Administration. Then we had the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.2 '
15. Charles A. Sullivan, The Under-Theorized Asterisk Footnote, 93 GEO. L.J. 1093 (2005).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University, James E. Beasley School of Law.
16. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 11th Cong. (2009).
17. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
18. H.R. 1338, 110th Cong. (2008); S. 182, 111th Cong. (2009). The Paycheck Fairness Act was
reintroduced in the House in 2009, H.R. 12, 111th Cong. (2009).
19. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213).
20. Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (to be codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and
42 U.S.C.).




I want to suggest a change of the panel's title, if Scott will allow it, to
maybe, "Resuscitating Employee Rights." We appear to be taking em-
ployee rights back to the spot that they were in before we had some really
problematic Supreme Court decisions that got in the way. Maybe it is not
so much of a revival but just a return to what we all thought was the law in
the first place.
Robin and I were tasked with providing information to everyone about
pending employment discrimination legislation, and that task at first
seemed quite easy until we started our search of possible bills to include.
Our initial research ended up with 200 pieces of legislation, which we have
organized into three charts.
The shortest chart is a chart of actually enacted legislation. There is a
brief summary of that legislation. The next chart is a detailed summary of
important pending legislation that Robin and I felt belonged within the
scope of this panel, upcoming employment discrimination legislation a d
legislation that is important to the field, such as the Arbitration Fairness
Act. But to not leave out anything others might view as potential pieces of
employment discrimination legislation and wanting to be thorough we
created a third chart that includes other pending legislation that might be of
interest to people in this room that really does not fall within the aegis of
our panel here today. The charts, updated since this talk was given, are
available at http://www.law.temple.edu/Pages/Faculty/NFacultySperino
Main.aspx.
We have broken our talk into three pieces. First, I am going to address
selected non-discrimination legislation and procedural legislation, and
Robin will take over the ENDA discussion at the end. That will leave
selected unpaid and paid leave legislation for Robin, and then we leave
Charlie with the big picture.
I will not cover the field of all enacted and pending legislation. Rather,
I picked out legislation of importance. I think I have actually found a new
favorite pending piece of legislation, the Protecting Older Workers against
22Discrimination Act, which I am hoping does not get abbreviated to
POWADA - it just does not sound right. First I will discuss GINA,2 3 the
Arbitration Fairness Act, 24 the Notice Pleading Restoration Act,2 5 and then
Robin will talk about ENDA.2 6
22. H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009).
23. 122 Stat. 881.
24. H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
25. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009).
26. H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1584, 11th Cong. (2009).
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GINA, has two parts. Title I covers genetic information and health
services,27 which I am not going to deal with, and Title II covers genetic
information in employment.28 Recall that this was signed into law by
President George W. Bush, but, importantly, it did not take effect until
November of 2009, so the employment discrimination provision is still
recent legislation. Some of the health services provisions went into effect
earlier, but the employment provisions are fairly recent.
This law should be familiar to those who teach employment
discrimination law because the employment discrimination provisions of
GINA are largely modeled after Title VII. However, genetic information is
described in a way that may limit the scope of what some people think
would be covered by GINA. Genetic information is defined as information
about an individual's genetic test, the genetic test of family members, or the
manifestation of a disease or disorder in a family member.2 9 GINA does not
cover manifestation of the disease in a covered employee. I think many
people when they were thinking about this act thought there would be a
considerable overlap with the ADA; but manifestation of a disease is not
covered by the act, so there is not as much overlap as we may have
anticipated.
I wanted to get a sense of whether the defense bar thought that GINA
was reviving employee rights. Based on the blogs, the defense bar is saying
GINA is a solution in search of a problem.30 Defense lawyers do not think
it is a big deal at least as far as the non-discrimination in employment
provisions go. Employers are attuned to the increased cost of health
services if someone has a genetic condition, but for the most part the
defense bar has said: our employers usually are not collecting this kind of
information, they are usually not acting on it, it is not a big deal, GINA is
going to help a very small number of plaintiffs. What employer attorneys
do seem concerned about are the other, non-employment, parts of the act.
27. §§ 101-06, 122 Stat. at 883-905.
28. §§ 201-13, 122 Stat. at 905-20.
29. § 201(4)(A), 122 Stat. at 885 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff(4)(A)).
30. See, e.g., The Genetic Information and Non-Discrimination Act: Quick Fix or Permanent
Solution?, ST. LOUis UNIV. J. HEALTH LAW & POL'Y BLOG, (July 8, 2008), <http://lawblogs.
slu.edu/healthlaw/?p=189>; D. Maimon Kirschenbaum, New Anti Employment Discrimination Law
Prohibits Genetic Discrimination, EMPLOYMENT LAWYER BLOG, (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:52 PM),
<http://www.employment-lawyer-blog.com/2010/03/new-anti-employment-discrimina.html>; Adria B.
Martinelli, The GINA's Out of the Bottle - and It's a New Weapon in the Work-Family Arsenal, THE
DELAWARE EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG, (Feb. 4, 2010) <http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.com/
2010/02/theginas outofthebottleis.html>; Allen Smith, Coordinate GINA Compliance with Leave,





GINA also prohibits the collection of genetic information, with certain
exceptions," and prohibits retaliation.3 2 It also, very similarly to the ADA,
requires that any genetic information that is collected be kept in a separate
file.33 The concern from the defense bar is largely that when an employer
collects routine medical information that it gets either through ADA
inquiries, or medical exams that are undertaken for some reason, all of this
information will end up advertently or inadvertently in an employee's file
and then the employer will be liable under the GINA collection
provisions.34 I thought that sounded like a legitimate concern until I looked
at the EEOC's proposed regulations and this is one instance where I think
the EEOC has actually taken a pretty defense oriented or very conservative
viewpoint about the scope of GINA, at least in certain circumstances. The
regulations try to calm the fears of employers by providing that as long as
an employer is not exceeding the scope of a normal ADA request, if it puts
something on the request that says it is not seeking the employee's genetic
information, but accidentally ends up with that information, it will not be
considered to have violated GINA. 35
One of the things that this act will do in practice is require employers
to modify, some of their ADA practices, which may work in favor of
employees in the end. Employers may have to be more circumspect about
the kinds of information that they ask for, especially when they conduct
medical exams. I think one of the key issues that will come up is when
employees go in for that medical exam, that medical exam asks for family
history information that is now clearly prohibited for the employer to have.
Therefore, I think employers are going to step back and not be asking for as
much information.
Does GINA resuscitate or evive employee rights? Maybe it revives
them a tiny bit, but I do not think it goes that far. It was not overly
controversial legislation - about thirty-five state laws already prohibited
very similar conduct36 - but now we have federal egislation.
31. § 202(b), 122 Stat. at 907-08 (to be codified at42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(b)).
32. § 207(f), 122 Stat. at 917 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-6(f)).
33. § 206(a), 122 Stat. at 913 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(a)).
34. See Adria Martinelli, GINA's Impact on Employers: Pink Ribbons and Yellow Bracelets, THE
DELAWARE EMPLOYMENT LAW BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010), <http://www.delawareemploymentlawblog.
com/2010/02/ginas impact on employerspink.html>; Smith, supra note 30.
35. See Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg.
9056, 9061 (proposed Mar. 29, 2009) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1635.8), available at
<http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-4221.htm>; see also Background Information for EEOC
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking On Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008,
<http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qandageneticinfo.html> (last modified May 12, 2009).
36. By the time GINA was enacted, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia had enacted
statutes prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of genetic information. For a chart listing
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On to the Ledbetter Act which was the first piece of legislation that
President Obama signed into law.7 It essentially sought to reverse the
Ledbetter decision,38 and I want to talk briefly today about whether it does
that or whether it does something more. Charlie has written that we may
get a little bit more out of the Ledbetter Act than just a reversal of the
Ledbetter decision. The Ledbetter Act reinstated the EEOC's paycheck
accrual rule as to how the limitations period worked not only in Title VII
but the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the ADA, and the
Rehabilitation Act.39 Some might say this is a revival of employee rights.
But I argue that it is not really a revival right; we are just getting back most
of what we had before the Supreme Court took it away.
There might be a little ray of sunshine through the Ledbetter Act,
though. The Ledbetter Act's language, "when an individual is affected by
the application of a discriminatory compensation decision or other
practice," may allow a plaintiff to challenge things like lateral transfers or
40evaluations that at a later time result in compensation discrimination.
Courts now have a very difficult time recognizing that a plaintiff has a
claim if a negative evaluation goes into the file or if there is a lateral
transfer. The courts' understanding is that these are not adverse enough to
be cognizable under some of the employment statutes,41 and so Charlie and
others have argued that perhaps the Ledbetter Act is one way to get around
some of those other decisions.42
them with links to the statutory provisions and a comparison of common protections, see Genetic
Employment Laws, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, <http://www.ncsl.org/default.
aspx?tabid=14280> (last updated Jan. 2008); see also Alissa Johnson, Plunging into the Gene Pool,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (2007), <http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch
/Health/StateLegislaturesMagazinePlungingintotheGen/tabid/13790/Default.aspx> (while the laws
enacted in each state were different, they generally prohibited employers from requesting applicants and
potential employees from undergoing genetic testing prior to, or contingent on, an offer of
employment).
37. Sheryl Gay Stoberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 2009,
available at <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html>.
38. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
39. Pub. L. No. 111-2, § 5(a)-(b), 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
40. Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TUL. L. REV.
499 (2010).
41. See Lucero v. Nettle Creek Sch. Corp., 566 F.3d 720 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that
reassignment of teacher from twelfth grade/Honors/AP English classes to seventh grade English class
not actionable despite the teacher's argument that the new position was not as prestigious); McCrary v.
Aurora Pub. Sch., 57 F. App'x 362 (10th Cir. 2003) (finding that teacher who was transferred was not
subject to an adverse employment action since she received same salary and benefits, had same
seniority in position, and had same job responsibilities).
42. Sullivan, supra note 40, at 545-46 (noting that "[t]here is surely something wrong with
creating a cause of action for which the statute of limitations expires before the cause of action accrues"
and theorizing that the Ledbetter Act could shift focus from actions that caused immediate harm, to
those that have a proscribed effect, and make these actionable as well); see also Carolyn E. Sorock,
362 i[Vol. 14:355
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One of the most interesting parts about the Ledbetter Act is what was
left behind. When the Ledbetter Act was presented in the House of
Representatives, there was another piece of legislation attached to it, the
Paycheck Fairness Act, and the Paycheck Fairness Act passed the House,43
but when the Ledbetter Act made its way to the Senate, the Paycheck
Fairness Act got cut off.44 The Paycheck Fairness Act is an extension of the
Equal Pay Act.45 It seeks to make it more difficult for employers to justify
gender-based pay disparities. In essence, it makes the employer prove that a
pay disparity is based on a bona fide factor other than sex and then it lists
some ways in which the employer is required to do that.46 The employer
would be required to justify why these pay disparities exist in the first
place. In addition, the Paycheck Fairness Act would increase the remedies
available under the Equal Pay Act, which I think is long overdue. As many
of us who practice in the remedies area know, some of the Equal Pay Act
provisions only allow for back pay and liquidated damages,47 and for low
wage workers, that remedy is not much money. So if the Paycheck Fairness
Act were actually enacted, punitive damages and other sorts of
compensatory damages would be available to employees.48
Now we get to my favorite piece of legislation, the Protecting Older
Workers against Discrimination Act.49 By the name, you would think it
would amend the ADEA, and that is one thing that it does, but it also
attempts to do some other fascinating things. It would amend the ADEA to
ensure that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment - and here
is the interesting part - and the standards of other anti-discrimination
statutes, are no different than the standards for making the same proof
under Title VII. 50
This is a response to the Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc." In the past, the Supreme Court had interpreted the
Comment, Closing the Gap Legislatively: Consequences of the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 85 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1199, 1210-12 (2010) (arguing that the broad language of the Ledbetter Act opens up the
"possibility for discrimination based on denial of promotions, demotions, denial of training
opportunities, denial of assignments, and anything else that could have an effect on an employee's
compensation by causing them to be paid less than others").
43. H.R. 1338, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, July 31, 2008).
44. H.R. 1338 (as referred to S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Aug. 1, 2008).
45. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(b) (2006)).
46. H.R. 1338 § 3.
47. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
48. H.R. 1338 § 3.
49. H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009).
50. H.R. 3721 § 3; S. 1756 § 3.
51. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (holding that plaintiffs must demonstrate but for causation to state a
claim under the ADEA).
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relevant causal language in Title VII to embody a motivating factor
standard, and then all of a sudden, I think now because Justices Scalia and
Thomas maybe have convinced more of the Court that they are right, the
Supreme Court interpreted the exact same language in the ADEA as
requiring but-for causation, without a clear explanation for the different
treatment for the same words.52 Why does this become my favorite piece of
legislation? It's because it does a lot of little sneaky things. From the title,
you would think this just amends the ADEA. It is just a response to Gross,
not a big deal. However, the bill not only adds new language into the
ADEA, but also purports to add the motivating factor language into "any
Federal law forbidding employment discrimination," any law forbidding
retaliation, and "any provision of the Constitution that protects against
discrimination or retaliation" unless the law has an express provision
regarding the legal burdens of proof.5 3 In essence what the law seeks to do
is insert its version of motivating factor broadly across civil rights and
other types of legislation. Also, the statute indicates that plaintiffs under the
ADEA may use the McDonnell Douglas54 proof structure when proceeding
with ADEA claims. The Supreme Court has assumed that it is okay to use
McDonnell Douglas but it has not actually decided the issue.56 So this
statute will codify, if it's enacted, that McDonnell Douglas can be used, so
that question can also be resolved. Just by looking at the name and thinking
the statute is a response to Gross, you might think it is a very limited piece
of legislation, but indeed it does quite a bit more.
We come to the Arbitration Fairness Act, which seeks to limit the use
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements, for our purposes, in employment
discrimination suits and other types of civil rights lawsuits. It also tries to
take questions about he validity or enforcement of certain kinds of pre-
dispute arbitration agreements out of the arbitrator's hands and back into
58 hasthe courts, which has been a fairly contentious issue over the years.59
52. Id. at2351.
53. H.R. 3721 §§ 3(5)(B)-(D), 3(6); S. 1756 §§ 3(5)(B)-(D), 3(6).
54. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (established the burden-shifting
framework of establishing proof in an employment discrimination case under Title VII).
55. H.R. 3721 § 3(4); S. 1756 § 3(4).
56. See O'Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996) (assuming the McDonnell
Douglas framework was applicable to the ADEA, as the parties did not contest that point); Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
57. H.R. 1020 111th Cong (2009) (discharged by H.R. Subcomm. on Commercial & Admin. Law
of Comm. on the Judiciary, June 21, 2009); S. 931, 111th Cong. (as referred to S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Apr. 29, 2009).
58. H.R. 1020 § 2(c); S. 931 § 402(b)(1).
59. Compare Rent-a-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776-79 (2010) (enforcing an arbitration
contract's delegation to the arbitrator to determine validity of the arbitration agreement) with id. at
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Unfortunately, the House version and the Senate version of this bill still
have pretty important differences in them. For example, the House version
broadly excludes collective bargaining agreements from the Arbitration
Fairness Act,60 and the Senate version has some exemptions for collective
bargaining agreements, but then has exemptions on its exemptions - so in
other words certain collective bargaining agreements would be exempted,
or certain provisions of collective bargaining agreements would be
exempted, but there are certain provisions the labor unions would not be
able to subject to arbitration.61 Additionally, the Senate version does a
better job of defining its terms. The House version provides operative
language, but the Senate version goes further to define what the operative
language is supposed to mean, which people who are against the
Arbitration Fairness Act actually think is pretty important because some of
the terms can have multiple meanings or are ambiguous. Also, the Senate
version limits the validity and enforcement issues that are going to be
subject to court decision, rather than an arbitrator's decision. In essence, the
House language could be read as subjecting almost any validity or
enforcement question, perhaps on any arbitration agreement, to court
decision. The Senate version makes it a little more clear that it is really
talking about whether these types of agreements, the ones that would fall
within the Arbitration Fairness Act, are valid or not.62
And finally there is the Notice Pleading Restoration Act,63 which
seeks to return pleading standards to a Conley v. Gibson standard,64 the
standard that most of us taught until a few years ago. I am not sure what
effect this will have on employment discrimination cases because we really
have not seen the full effects that Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly65and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal66 have had on discrimination cases. Because Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A. 67 was an employment discrimination case, we still may be
still seeing some of the benefits of Conley v. Gibson, so maybe
2781-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the controversy and disagreeing with enforcement).
60. H.R. 1020 § 2(d).
61. S. 931 § 402(b)(2).
62. S. 931 § 402(b)(1).
63. S. 1504, 111th Cong. (as referred to the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, July 22, 2009).
64. 355 U.S. 41, 46 (holding that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim
unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief').
65. 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (holding that plaintiffs must allege facts that make their claim plausible).
66. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (applying Twombly to a constitutional claim).
67. 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (holding that an employment discrimination complaint had no heightened
pleading standard and need not c ntain specific facts that would give rise to a prima facie case of
discrimination).
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employment discrimination law has not been affected as much by Twombly
and Iqbal as other type of claims.
Professor Scott A. Moss: Before we turn it over to Robin, I want to
ask one moderator's question for Sandra. Getting back to your favorite law,
the Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act, that proposed
legislation protects many people other than older workers. It says that all
employment related claims enjoy the standard set by Title VII. But under
Title VII, the motivating factor standard, according to most authority I have
seen, applies only to discrimination claims, whereas retaliation claims
according to at least some circuit authority I have seen, still face the Price
Waterhouse but-for test.6 8 Does the Protecting Older Workers against
Discrimination Act, in saying that all employment claims employ Title VII
standards, acknowledge that Title VII has two different standards?
Professor Sandra Sperino: It's not clear. One of the interesting parts
of the legislation is its opening provision. The introductory language says
that when Congress adopted the ADEA and subsequent legislation, it was
largely relying upon what was going on with Title VII when it made its
assumptions about the language that was inserted.69 So I think there is still
some ambiguity. It is at least redirecting the courts to look back and assume
that Congress was relying on a certain understanding of employment
discrimination law, and maybe that understanding is not as set as we would
like it to be. And with that, I will turn it back to Robin.
Professor Robin R. Runge*: Thanks Sandra. Picking up on the theme
that Sandra started with and moving into my part of the presentation, I will
start with ENDA and move into pending leave from work legislation.
ENDA is an interesting bill from a longitudinal perspective. The majority
of the bills that Sandra discussed have been introduced recently for the first
time or have been around for maybe two Congresses, in some instances in
response to particular cases from the Supreme Court or other
developments. In contrast to the bills that I will be talking about, many of
which have been pending for fifteen years. ENDA is a perfect example.
ENDA has been pending in some form since 1994. If passed, it would
prohibit discrimination in employment based upon sexual orientation.70
68. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that an employer could escape
liability if it could prove that it would have taken the same action without considering the improper
characteristic).
69. H.R. 3721, § 2(a), 111th Cong. (2009); S. 1756, § 2(a), 111th Cong. (2009).
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.
70. E.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 4636, 103d Cong. (1994); Employment Non-
Discrimination Act, H.R. 1863, 104th Cong. (1995); Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1858,
105th Cong. (1997).
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More recent versions have expressly included prohibiting discrimination in
employment based on sexual identity.71 In recent years there has been some
strife within the LGBT communities and members of Congress, including
Representative Barney Frank and others, about whether to give up on
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual identity to try to get protection
from discrimination based on sexual orientation passed.72 I am not
extraordinarily well versed on that, so I am not going to go into it but just
wanted to flag that that has been a heated point in efforts to pass this
legislation.
Because the legislation has been pending for a long time, there was, as
Sandra said, extraordinary hope, last fall especially, that it was finally
going to pass. The most recent hearings that were held in the House and
Senate are indications of that hope, and in preparing for this talk, I recalled
statements that Senator Kennedy made in a Senate hearing stating that this
legislation is a priority and is going to pass.73 So I think that hope still
exists. The legislation is due.
Only twenty states and the District of Columbia currently expressly
prohibit discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation.7 4 This
stands in contrast to many other pieces of employment legislation, like the
FMLA, which about half the states had passed some version of by the time
it was passed by Congress. So ENDA would be very forward looking,
especially if it is able to pass with sexual identity included. I am hopeful
that this bill will become law.
Modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in many ways,
ENDA covers employers of fifteen or more employees. However, it does
not include a disparate impact claim. 7 But beyond that, its coverage is very
similar to what we are familiar with under Title VII, the ADA, and other
federal anti-discrimination statutes.
I want to move into the pending leave legislation. Before I do, I
thought it would be good to remind ourselves about the FMLA because if
we start talking about legislation that would amend it, we should know
71. Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 2981, § 4, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3017, § 4,
111th Cong. (2009); S.1584, § 4, 111th Cong. (2009).
72. Carolyn Lochhead, Rights Champion Tells off Gay Allies, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 12, 2007, at Al;
Jeremy Herb, Frank Battles for Transgender Workers' Rights: Fight Expected over Provision in
Current Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14, 2010, at 2.
73. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act: Hearing on S.1284 Before the Comm. on Health,
Educ., Labor & Pensions, 107th Cong. 107-307 (2002) (statement of Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman).
74. Equal Opportunity: Laws, HuMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, <http://www.hrc.org/issues/work
place/equalopportunity/equal opportunity laws.asp> (last viewed Nov. 8, 2010).
75. H.R. 2981, § 3(a); H.R. 3017, § 3(a); S.1584, § 3(a).
76. H.R. 2981, § 4(g); H.R. 3017, § 4(g); S. 1584, § 4(g).
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what we are amending. In the context of an employment discrimination
panel, you may wonder how leave from work fits. There is a very firm anti-
discrimination provision in the FMLA. The FMLA is a bill that took fifteen
years, others would say eighteen years to pass. It was the first bill that
President Clinton signed when he came into office, and it is the only
federal legislation today that requires employers to provide any kind of job
guaranteed leave from work. This is all we have, and it's unpaid leave. But
the passage of the FMLA was a watershed moment. I am going to talk in
more detail about the FMLA, and then I am going to talk about unpaid and
paid leave bills, some of which have already passed, but others which have
not yet, but I think will.
The FMLA provides for up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave every
twelve months to eligible employees.77 Eligible employees are those who
have worked for at least a year and 1250 hours in the last year prior to
taking the leave. Employers covered by the FMLA are employers that
have fifty or more employees within a seventy-five mile radius.79 It may
sound like the FMLA covers a huge percentage of employees and
employers, but in fact it does not. About 40 percent of the workforce is not
covered by this piece of legislation.80 And having just moved to North
Dakota, where the entire population is 600,000 people, the majority of
employees and employers are not covered by the FMLA.
Employees may take the leave provided by the FMLA for their own
serious health condition or that of their child, their spouse, or their parent,
and also for the birth of a child or for the placement of a child with the
employee or for adoption or for foster care.1 That leave is unpaid.82 The
FMLA allows an employee to take accrued sick or vacation time with
FLMA leave in some circumstances.83 An employer is required to provide
continued health benefits while an employee is out on FMLA leave,
consistent with the arrangement existing before the leave was taken. If an
employee has some form of health insurance and the employer paid some
percentage of it, that continues while the employee is on FMLA leave.84
Additionally, after the leave ends, the employer must return the employee
77. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
78. Id. § 2611.
79. Id. § 2614.
80. See Request for Information on the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 71 Fed. Reg.
69511 (Dec. 1, 2006).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a).
82. Id. § 2612(c).
83. 29 C.F.R. § 825.207 (2010); see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(d)(2).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a).
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to the same position or a similar position. The employee cannot be fired for
taking the leave.85 And as I mentioned, it is illegal under the act for an
employee to be discriminated against for exercising rights under the act.8 6 I
like to think of it as "bubble time" for lack of a better description. It can't be
counted on an employee's absences, it can't be considered in decisions on
promotions, it's like it never happened.
As of 2002, over twenty states had some form of state unpaid, job
guaranteed leave law.87 Now, states have adopted laws that are broader
then the FMLA to include time off to attend a child's school event or for
other kinds of related issues.8 8 In addition, in the last couple of years, we
have seen paid leave legislation introduced in the states and paid leave
legislation pending on the federal level. California,8 9 New Jersey,90
Washington State,91 and the District of Columbia9 2 have some of form of
paid leave legislation. These are very complicated statutes, in terms of how
the leave and the pay are calculated, where the money comes from, and
what percentage of your salary you get while you are out, but importantly
only Washington State's provides job protection with the paid leave.93 So
we have paid leave passing in the states but it doesn't have the same job
protection that you get with the FMLA. So you have some interesting
situations happening in these states where employees accessing the paid
leave must also be covered by the FMLA to ensure their jobs are protected
if they take the leave. Just last year, the District of Columbia passed the
Accrued Sick and Safe Leave Act,94 which provides a sliding scale of days
off depending on the size of the employer. Employees of an employer that
has 100 employees or more get up to seven days, employees of an
85. Id.
86. Id. § 2615.
87. See Jane Waldfogel, Family Leave Coverage in the 1990s, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 1999, at
13, 13. State-by-State Guide to Unpaid, Job-Protected Family and Medical Leave Laws, NAT'L
PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES (2003), <http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/
StateunpaidFMLLaws.pdf~docID=969>.
88. The following states give parents unpaid leave to attend their child's school or educational
activities. Cal Lab Code § 230 8 (West 2009); the District of Columbia, D.C. Code §13-1202 (2009);
Massachusetts, Mass Gen Laws ch 149, § 52(d)(b)(1) (2009); Minnesota, Minn Stat § 181 9412 (2009);
Rhode Island, R. I. Gen Laws § 24-48-12 (2009); and Vermont, Vt Stat Ann tit. 23, § 472a(a)(1) (2009).
The following states give workers unpaid leave to take family members to routine medical visits:
Massachusetts, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 52(d)(b)(2), (3) (2009), and Vermont, Vt Stat Ann tit. 23, §
472a(a)(2) (2009).
89. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-06 (West 2009).
90. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:21-49 (West 2009).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.86.020 (2009).
92. D.C. CODE § 32-131.01-17 (2009).
93. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 49.86.020 with CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-06; D.C.
CODE § 32-131.0-17; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:21-49.
94. D.C. CODE § 31-131.01-17.
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employer that has fifty to ninety-nine employees get up to five days, and
employees of an employer that has twenty-five to forty-nine employees get
up to three days.95 This is the only paid leave in the country that goes
beyond paid leave to care for your own serious health condition or for the
birth of a child and actually includes taking paid leave to address the
employee's victimization from domestic violence, sexual assault, or
stalking, or caring for a family member who is a victim of those crimes.96
As of today, ten states have legislation that requires employers of a
certain size or larger to provide some form of unpaid, job guaranteed leave
to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and stalking.9 7 On the
federal level, President Obama mentioned this type of legislation in his
agenda last fall.9 8 This mention is important in the context of thinking
about what might be passed by Congress. These laws provide job
guaranteed leave from work to employers who are victims of these crimes
to go to court, to seek medical attention, to access support services, or to
obtain legal assistance.99 This leave is not just about taking leave for
injuries or illnesses caused by the victimization; it goes beyond that to
addressing that victimization in a legal forum.
Moving into pending legislation, I want to start with amendments to
the FMLA, now that we reacquainted ourselves with what that is. Since the
FMLA passed, in every Congress there has been some form of legislation
introduced to expand the coverage and scope of the act. From the
beginning, there have been efforts to lower the threshold number of
employees and to expand the reasons for taking leave. The first
amendments to the Family Medical Leave Act that passed were a part of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008,100 and then most recently
in 2009.101 These two pieces of legislation significantly expanded the
FMLA's coverage. A third bill, the Technical Corrections Act, covered
flight attendants and pilots who were unintentionally left out of coverage
95. D.C. CODE § 31-131.02(b)(4) (2009).
96. Id.
97. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230, 230.1 (West 2009); COLO REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.7 (2009); FLA.
STAT. § 741.313 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-72 (2009); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1 through 45
(2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 26, § 850 (2009); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
215.14 (McKinney 2009); N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-B-5.5 (2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.270 (2009).
98. Agenda: Family, CHANGE.GOV: OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ELECT, <http://change.gov/
agenda/familyagenda/> (last viewed Nov. 8, 2010).
99. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230, 230.1; COLO REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.7; FLA. STAT. § 741.313;
HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-72; 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15(3); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1132; ME. REV.
STAT. tit. 26, § 850; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.14; N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-B-5.5; OR. REV. STAT. §
659A.270.
100. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44 (2008).
101. Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2309 (2009).
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under the FMLA, because of how their hours of work are counted.10 2
The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 created two new
kinds of leave,'03 which no one seems to know about. These are in response
to the fact that we have been at war for nearly ten years, and an increasing
percentage of our population has been overseas as a part of the armed
forces. The act creates two different kinds of leave for the individuals who
are called up to military service overseas and who may experience injuries
related to that, or for family members who, as a result of an individual
being called up for service may need to miss work. The first kind of leave
that was created is the qualifying exigency leave, which requires employers
covered by the FMLA to grant an employee eligible under the FMLA
twelve weeks of unpaid leave in a twelve month period for qualifying
exigencies arising out of the employees' spouse, son, daughter, or parent
who is on active duty or who has been notified of an impending call or
order to active duty.104 The regulations that were issued in 2008 give some
examples of what exigency leave is, those things that you have to do to
prepare for the person to report or to take care of things while the person is
gone.105 It is important to note that the qualifying exigency leave is only for
family members of military in the regular armed forces. 10 6 It didn't extend
to the reserves.107
The other kind of leave that was created by the 2008 amendments is
military caregiver relief. This provision expands the FMLA to provide
leave to a covered service member who is a current member of the Armed
Forces including the National Guard or reserves, who is undergoing
medical treatment, recuperation or therapy, or is otherwise an outpatient.
The leave is limited to a combination of a total of twenty-six work weeks
of leave for any FMLA-qualifying reason during a single twelve month
period.'08 So an eligible employee may take another twelve weeks, if the
employee has an injury or illness incurred in the line of active duty. This
provision is a big expansion, given that an employer may be required to
give an employee twenty-six weeks of leave instead of twelve.109
Let me summarize these two kinds of new FMLA leave. An individual
service member employee who experiences injuries or illness caused by
102. Pub. L. No. 111-119, 123 Stat. 3476 (2009).
103. Pub. L. No. 110-181, §585, 123 Stat. 128-32.
104. Id. §585(a)(2), 122 Stat. 129.
105. 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 825 (2010)).
106. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 585(a)(2), 122 Stat. 129.
107. Id.
108. Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 585(a)(3), (4), 122 Stat. 129.
109. Id.
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service may take leave to heal from the injuries or illness. Also, a family
member of a service member who is an eligible employee may take leave
to care for the service member if he or she has been injured or to take care
of matters related to that service member's current or impending absence
when the service member has been or will soon be called in to service. It is
very narrowly focused in one way - on people in the active services or
reserves or armed forces, but in another way, it is very expansive - the
reasons one can take the leave have been expanded from the original
FMLA. These amendments have redefined what a serious health condition
is under these circumstances, and it's not just the immediate family
members that can take the leave. The caregiver leave is not just a parent,
spouse, or child, but also includes next of kin.110 So now we have tweaked,
just in this context, who can take the leave, what the leave can be taken for,
and which relationships matter.
These are the first amendments to the FMLA that have passed since
the FMLA was adopted in 1993 even though many bills, five to ten every
session, have been introduced in each Congress. So the passage of these
amendments is really significant in many ways. Having said that, I do not
see the gates opening so that all of the amendments to the FMLA that have
been pending over the years will now pass. These amendments were about
the military, these bills passed when we were at war; attached to bills
funding over war efforts.
The third amendment o the FMLA that was passed is a very technical
but important bill. Basically, Senator Murray and several other members of
Congress recognized that pilots and flight attendants had been found to not
be covered by the FMLA because of the way their hours were counted, but
this result was not what Congress had intended."' The amendment clarified
that flight crew members would be considered to meet the FMLA's hours
requirement if they had worked or had been paid for 60 percent of the
applicable monthly guarantee, which is a term of art in that field, or the
equivalent of that annualized over the preceding twelve months.12 The
cause of their not being covered by the FMLA was that even though these
employees are paid for the time, they are required not to work between
shifts, and that time not working, though compensated, was not counted for
the FMLA. There were at least two cases where flight attendants or pilots
had litigated this issue under the FMLA, and the courts expressly held that
they were not covered under the FMLA because they did not meet the
1 10. Id.
111. Pub. L. No. 111-119, § 101(2), 123 Stat. 3476 (2009).
112. Id.
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hours requirements." 3
This brings us to pending federal unpaid leave legislation. The first
category is leave from work for crime victims to address their
victimization. Some form of legislation has been pending in Congress since
1996 to provide job guaranteed leave to victims of domestic violence, and I
have worked on all the iterations of those bills. The bills are in the updated
chart that can be found at http://www.law.temple.edu/Pages/Faculty/
N_FacultySperinoMain.aspx. They provide some form of job guaranteed
leave for victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking: the
Domestic Violence Leave Act 1 4 and the Security and Financial
Empowerment Act."'5 The members of Congress involved in those pieces
of legislation have been working on them almost continuously since 1996,
in addition to Senators Wellstone and Kennedy who were both champions
of those bills for many years, but who are sadly no longer with us.
In addition the David Ray Richardson Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 116
would give time off from work to address victimization caused by a hate
crime. These bills all provide unpaid leave from work. These bills are not
amendments to the FMLA. So this type of legislation is going in a different
direction than the military families legislation. There is a long standing
debate going on among my peers about whether it is better to tweak, play
with, amend, fix, or expand the FMLA or to go in a different direction
entirely. These bills reflect a decision to move away from the FMLA.
The next category of leave legislation, aims to expand the FMLA by
changing the definition of covered employer, the definition of an eligible
employee, and the qualifying reasons for taking FMLA leave. Some form
of legislation has been pending to do these things since the FMLA was
passed, and these are the most recent iterations. The first eliminates the
hours requirement.1 17 As a former legal aid lawyer - elimination of the
1250 hours threshold, in the FMLA would resut in many more low income
workers eligible for FMLA leave. This is a huge barrier for low income
working women particularly. The second would lower the number of
employees required for employer coverage by the FMLA. 18 Again,
because the number of employees who are required for employer coverage
113. Rivero v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 04 C 6514, 2005 WL 3159244 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Rich v.
Delta Airlines, 21 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
114. H.R.2515, 111th Cong. (2009).
115. H.R. 739, 111th Cong. (2009).
116. H.R. 262, 111th Cong. (2009).
117. Family Fairness Act, H.R. 389, 111th Cong. (2009).
118. FMLA Enhancement Act, H.R. 824, 111th Cong. (2009); Balancing Act, H.R. 3047, 111th
Cong. (2009).
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is fifty, almost 40 percent of the workforce isn't covered by the FMLA.
Dropping the number of employees to twenty-five would clearly be more
inclusive. The third bill expands the qualifying relationships under the
FMLA to include taking leave to care for siblings, same sex spouses or
domestic partners, and their child or parent.119 Currently, if my sister
became ill, I could not take time from work to care for her under the
FMLA. If I had a domestic partner who became ill, I could not take time
off to care for her. The last piece of legislation in this group would expand
the FMLA to permit an employee to take leave for providing a living organ
donation. 120
The last thing I want to mention is part of Sandra's theme that these
legislative proposals are bringing us back to where we started for employee
rights rather than moving us forward. In 2008, the U.S. Department of
Labor issued new regulations amending the regulations that were issued
initially with the FMLA, and those amendments did two things. First, they
explained and incorporated the two different kinds of military leave that I
have already described.12 1 Second they addressed recent U.S. Supreme
Court cases and attempted to clarify the coverage of the FMLA while also
limiting its scope.122 The Family Medical Leave Restoration Actl23 is a
pending bill that would repeal these regulations and restore the original
regulations.
There are also six bills pending in Congress that would require some
employers to provide some form of paid leave to employees for specific
reasons. Representative DeLauro from Connecticut and Senator Kennedy
introduced the Healthy Families Act. Under this Act, employers of fifteen
or more employees would be required to permit employees to earn at least
one hour of paid sick time for every thirty hours the person works,
increasing over time and varying by the different size of employers to
about seven days of paid leave per year.124 Employers may provide more
generous paid leave, but they would not be required to.12 5 This paid leave is
119. Family and Medical Leave Inclusion Act, H.R. 2132, 111th Cong. (2009).
120. Living Donor Job Security Act, H.R. 2776, 111th Cong. (2009).
121. 73 Fed. Reg. 67,934 (Nov. 17, 2008).
122. Id. See Shel Lyons, Women's Rights: Changes in FMLA Limit Maternity Leave Options,
CHANGE.ORG (Dec. 2, 2008, 10:33 AM (PST)), <http://womensrights.change.org/blog/view/changes
in fmlalimitmaternityleave options>; Press Release, Statement of Debra L. Ness, President, Nat'l
Partnership for Women & Families, New FMLA Regulations Offer Bad News for Workers, Good News
for Military Families (Nov. 14, 2008), available at <http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/
PageServer?pagename=newsroom pr_PressRelease_081114> (both critiquing the new regulations).
123. H.R. 2161, 111th Cong. (2009).




similar to what some employers voluntarily give employees now. An
employee can take the sickness leave to go to the doctor, and to take care of
a close family member.12 6 The bill also expressly provides that an
employee can use this time if the employee is a victim of domestic
violence, sexual assault, or stalking, to address the victimization.12 7 So, we
are seeing those issues surface again here in the context of paid leave on a
federal level.
There are several other pieces of legislation pending that will create
some form of paid leave, and the chart has brief descriptions of those.
These have not seen the same traction as the Healthy Families Act, they
don't have as many co-sponsors and we haven't seen hearings. They are all
modeled on the same idea of creating for the first time a mandate for
employers of certain size or larger to provide paid leave to employees.
Studies show that 30 to 50 percent of the workforce in this country
currently has no paid off time from work at all. 12 8 Again, as a person who
represented low income workers for seven years, the vast majority of my
clients missed one day of work, were fired, and had no rights at all. So the
Healthy Families Act and similar bills currently pending in Congress could
make a profound difference by mandating paid leave.
Lastly, the Family Income to Respond to Significant Transitions Act
encourages states to pass paid leave legislation.129 The last bill in this
category is a response to HINI. It says you shouldn't be fired if you are
staying home from work because you have HlNl; so it requires employers
of a certain size or larger to provide five paid sick days every twelve
months to stay home if an employee has HINI .30
Professor Charles A. Sullivan*: My role here has been variously
described as presenting the big picture, talking about the forest now that we
have examined the trees, and looking at things from 30,000 feet. What it
really means in my mind is, I am supposed to state the obvious.
Fortunately, I'm pretty good at stating the obvious, and I'd like to state the
obvious about the whole legislative enterprise. By the way, the nice thing
about being at the 30,000 foot level is that it's hard to be wrong even if you
126. Id § 5(b)(1)-(3).
127. Id. § 5(b)(4).
128. See WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY, GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. CTR., WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010:
FACTS ON SHORT TERM TIME OFF 4 (2010), available at <http://workplaceflexibility2OlO.org/
images/uploads/STOFactSheet.pdf>; Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, News USDL 09-
0872, Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2009, at 13 tbl. 6 (2009), available at
<http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/ebnr0015.pdf>.
129. H.R. 2339, 111th Cong. (2009).
130. Emergency Influenza Containment Act, H.R. 3991, 111th Cong. (2009).
* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.
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make a lot of mistakes in the details.
Where I start is that Congress and the Supreme Court (and the courts
generally), have been playing two different games. If you look at what the
Democrats have been doing over the last forty years, more or less, is
passing legislation and the Republicans, by and large, don't try to repeal
those statutes - even on those rare occasions (albeit more common
recently) when they've had the theoretical power to do so. They fight it
when the Democrats seek to pass legislation and try to narrow it, but really
the grand strategy is to make sure the courts are packed with the kind of
people who give that legislation a narrow interpretation. And that strategy
has been very successful. Given the two games that are being played, you
might think that maybe the Republican control-the-courts game is really the
more important one.
The problem we face is that federal judges, at least the kind of federal
judges we've had for a long time now, don't like employment
discrimination suits. All sorts of research reveals how little success
plaintiffs have had, for example, the ADA studies which showed plaintiffs
lost 97 percent of all cases.' 3 1 Other areas did better, but not a whole lot
better. Of course, theoretically, it might be because these are really lousy
suits, but it might also be because the judges just don't like these suits very
much. While judges can deal with suits they don't like in a lot of ways, the
one I want to focus on is interpreting the statutes to radically reduce their
impact. We've seen that quite a lot. One of my favorite examples, not even
a Supreme Court case, is Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. 132 At issue there was the Older Worker's Benefit Protection
Act,133 whose language would suggest that an employee can't agree to
arbitrate future claims; that is, an employee couldn't waive in advance her
right to a jury trial. If the statute had been read the way it was written, there
would have been no predispute arbitration agreements where Age
Discrimination in Employment Act claims were concerned. Needless to
say, the Rosenberg court doesn't so hold. The relevant sentence says that
131. Amy L. Allbright, 2006 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I - Survey Update, 31
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 328, 328 (2007) (stating that in 2006, "[o]f the 218
[employment discrimination] decisions that resolved the claim (and have not yet changed on appeal),
97.2 percent resulted in employer wins and 2.8 percent in employee wins"); see also generally Kevin
M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad
to Worse?, 3 HARv. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004);
Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 547 (2003).
132. 170 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999).
133. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1998) (codified at 29 U.S.C § 626(f) (2006)).
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only "knowing and voluntary" waivers are effective, and waiver isn't
knowing and voluntary if it purports to "waive rights or claims that may
arise after the date the waiver is executed."l34 Well, "claims" would suggest
the underlying causes of action, but "rights" seems broader, and suggest
things like jury trial. And, after all, if substantive matters can't be waived
because of the "claims" language, what else could "rights" refer to but
procedural rights? But, no. For the Rosenberg court, both "rights" and
"claims" means substantive rights or claims.13 5 That is just one example of
what the lower courts have done.
And that leads us to Gross, 13 where the Supreme Court interpreted the
exact same language differently in two different statutes (Title VII and the
ADEA) to mean two different things.13 7 And the Court compounded its
confusion by its arrogance in not bothering to explain to us why it was
doing that.
There are lots of other familiar examples. Some of these have been
legislatively overruled, including General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, to go
back a ways, and Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,139 most
recently. Some of them we can hope will be overruled, such as Iqbal,140
which I think is probably the biggest threat to employee discrimination that
we are presently facing.
It's also important to note that it doesn't take much for a court to
interpret the essence of a statute away. These are usually not complicated
interpretive exercises. In Iqbal, the issue is the meaning of "short and plain
statement."1 4 1 And in Ledbetter the only word being interpreted was
"occur."1 42 Other examples include. Toyota Motors Manufacturing v.
Williams1 4 3 and Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,1" both interpreting
"disability."14 5 Of course, we fixed these interpretations, or we have tried to
134. 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(C) (2006).
135. 170 F.3d at 4.
136. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
137. See Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REv.
69, 69-70 (2010); Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 857 (2010); Catherine T.
Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C.L. REV.
279 (2010).
138. 429 U.S. 129 (1976).
139. 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
140. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
141. Id at 1949 (analyzing FED. R. CIv. P. 8).
142. 550 U.S. at 621.
143. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
144. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
145. Williams, 534 U.S. at 198; Sutton, 527 U.S. 489.
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fix them in the Americans with Disabilities Amendment Act of 2008.146
And then there's General Dynamics Land Systems v. Cline.'47 Without
regard to whether the Court was right, the point is that the reach of the
statute turned on the meaning of a single three-letter word, "age." 4 8 In
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court was figuring out the meaning
of "making and enforcing contracts," 49 and in TWA v. Hardison, the only
words being construed were "reasonable accommodation" and "undue
hardship."o Some of these have been overridden or there have been efforts
to override, and some of them haven't.
Of course, Congress doesn't approach drafting laws like the American
Law Institute approaches drafting a Restatement, and, despite the elaborate
processes of the American Law Institute, even Restatements often have
their own interpretive difficulties. So how might we deal with the problem
of ambiguity in statutes given that courts are masters in finding ambiguity,
whether or not it's there?
The answer might be to change the ground rules for the courts. During
the period in which these employment discrimination decisions have been
rendered, and not coincidentally, the courts have devised a different
approach to statutory construction, mostly called textualism, which has
robbed Congress of one of the principal mechanisms that it used to have to
make sure the courts didn't warp its enactments - shaping the meaning of a
statute through its legislative history. The use of legislative history to guide
courts is a little like a Restatement's "comments," although admittedly far
less precise. But a statute and committee reports which explain the statute
are at least roughly analogous to a Restatement and its comments
explaining its blackletter. Of course, a textualist court doesn't look at
committee reports unless the statute is ambiguous - and perhaps not then if
you're a true textualist. So the Supreme Court has, either by design or
coincidence, empowered the judiciary to do what it wants with the statute
as long as the judges can reach their preferred results textually.
A current example is the question of whether the courts take what I
call a "causation only" approach to interpreting the operative language of
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.' 5' I hope they say that the statute reaches
what it seems to say - "a discriminatory compensation decision or other
146. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in several sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.)
147. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
148. Id. at 586.
149. 491 U.S. 164, 176-77 (1989).
150. 432 U.S. 63, 76-77 (1977).
151. Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(3)(A)).
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practice" that results in "discrimination in compensation."5 2 But if they
want to narrow it, the courts might parse the language grammatically and
say that "compensation" decision should be interpolated between "other"
and "practice." So what it really means, and I am confident where the
Supreme Court would want to go on this one, is "discriminatory
compensation decision or other discriminatory compensation practice."
This would prevent the act from having any effect at all in the situation
where someone is not promoted and therefore doesn't get any raise because
he is not promoted. The courts would then say that the "practice" at stake is
not a "compensation" practice but rather a "promotion" practice, and the
violation occurred when the promotion was denied. If we look at the
legislative history, the better reading of it would be that "other practice"
means any other practice. But I'm afraid the Court is going to say that we
don't really have to look at the legislative history because the language is so
clear grammatically.
So what should we do about this problem? I am back to my role as
Captain Obvious. Well, we could appoint better judges. First of all, it's a
long term process. Second, it turns out that appointing empathetic judges is
not necessarily such a good idea; really, it was a bad thing in the court of
public opinion when the President tried appointing one empathetic judge,
and then she had to disclaim empathy before she got on the Court.15 3 Not to
mention, the Obama Administration hasn't been so good in appointing even
people who are not called empathetic as judges to the lower courts. So it is
not like this problem is being solved very fast, even though that's
potentially one solution.
Then there is a second solution which is to write better statutes. Now
most people in this room don't remember Lester Maddox, but he was a
racist governor of Georgia and was famous, among other things, for his
response when asked how he could improve the prisons in the state. He
replied, "we can't improve the prisons until we get a better class of
prisoner." 5 4 I kind of think that that's similar to asking Congress to write
better statutes. It's always to be hoped for but not to be expected. Not to
152. Charles A. Sullivan, Raising the Dead?: The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, 84 TuLANE L. REv.
499 (2010).
153. See Peter Baker & Charlie Savage, Groundwork for Next Time, N.Y. TIMEs, July 16, 2009, at
Al.
154. See Lois Romano, Carter and Ford on the Same Team: A Joint Crusade for Voter
Registration, WASH. POST, Oct. 1, 1983, at Cl (reporting that former President Carter elated, "I
remember when Georgia was 'blessed' by having Lester Maddox as governor, and one question raised in
his term of office was improvement of our prison system. And under pressure from the news media,
Lester Maddox finally shouted in desperation quite sincerely: 'The only time we'll improve our prison
system is to have a better class of prisoner.'").
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mention that some of the time the ambiguities in the statutes, the failures,
are the results of a political process everybody has agreed to. They are not
going to decide this issue because of the virtues of vagueness, and they can
all vote for a law if they don't get too specific. So I mean that's inherent in
the process, but even if this result is not inevitable, think of all the things on
the list I provided and ask yourself how many would have been avoided by
more specific statutory language.
That gets me to think a little more radically, and perhaps take a page
from someone else's text. I am thinking of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), 15 5 a right wing effort that changed the definition of marriage
throughout all fifty titles of the United States Code by virtue of altering a
single provision - the definition of marriage in the Dictionary Act.156 We
might think about such a dramatic approach to solving some of the
problems in our field. To start at the very beginning, why not define
"employment," a term which is almost never defined in the federal
employment statutes except circularly: an employee is a person employed
by an employer, and an employer is someone who employs fifteen or more
employees.157 Trying to figure out who we want those statutes to protect is
the kind of out-of-the-box thinking that we might want to talk about.
Another approach along these lines is congressional adoption of rules
of construction. I have to say, that I am not so certain that a statutory
provision that says the definition of disability shall be construed in favor of
broad coverage is going to do a whole lot of good, but it can't do any
harm. I do think that another ADAAA provision will be effective, although
it's framed as a rule of construction (and I am not sure why it's a rule of
construction rather than just a rule): "[T]he determination of whether a
disability substantially limits a major life activity shall made without regard
to ameliorative or mitigating measures."59 That's the kind of statutory
language I think that might be very helpful. Admittedly, in the case of a
legislative override we know exactly what the problem is. Looking down
the road to what the courts might do with statutory language is harder, but
it's not impossible to predict the kinds of things the courts might do and try
to lay down rules of construction in the statute itself.
And then there is my favorite. Why don't we just take back the ground
that the Court has taken from us? Congress has the power to influence the
155. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
156. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
157. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), (f) (2006).
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (Supp. I 2008).
159. Id. § 12102 (4)(E).
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interpretation of a statute by its legislative history, and the Court has taken
that away. Suppose Congress were to pass a DOMA-like statute, i.e., one
that prescribed what courts should do prospectively, instructing the courts
to look at the legislative history in interpreting laws.160 We could, of
course, define what we mean by legislative history. It could be anything to
everything, but most likely would encompass committee reports.
Why don't we do this? Justice Scalia can be quite biting when he talks
about the legislative history and occasionally points out that, say,
committee reports aren't generated until the statute has already passed.161 1
do think there is a delegation problem with respect to Congress passing a
statute and incorporating by reference a document that has yet to be
written. So I don't deny that there are constitutional problems lurking in the
background with respect to this, but if a committee report exists at the time
that Congress acts, I see no difficulty with Congress instructing the courts
to look at that committee report to determine the legislative history. This
would reinvest Congress with some of the power that has been taken away
from it without at the same time requiring Congress to write better laws.
While some think there are some constitutional problems with that
approach, I doubt it, and, anyway, even starting down that road would be
very instructive and really allow Congress to reengage the courts.
Now if you are going to say that if Justice Kennedy can write Gross
not bothering to tell us why he has a different way of interpreting the exact
same language differently, can't he find a way to take something like this or
any of my other proposals and ignore it. And the answer is yes. But you
know there may be some shame yet among some of the justices who have
taken this approach. We can't expect a total solution to this problem but I
think we can expect at least some better results if Congress takes a more
aggressive approach to what it is doing when it is making law. And it's not
just writing those laws but working to ensure that the laws when they
actually get applied will accomplish something at least remotely connected
to what at least some of the members Congress had in mind. This isn't a
panacea but, for a big picture kind of guy like me, this is forest that we
should be worrying about and the trees are all subordinate to that.
160. See generally Nicholas Quinn Rosenkrantz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115
HARv. L. REV. 2085 (2002).
161. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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